THOMAS SCHMITT
Cultural Governance as a conceptual framework
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Abstract

This Working Paper introduces a specific concept of cultural governance as a research concept for the humanities and social sciences. As a preliminary step, it discusses the term “culture” and the concept of governance. This discussion will be preceded by general remarks regarding social science-orientated research on culture. The Kulturwissenschaften (German for Humanities) must deal with the fact that, as a result of the history of the term, a diversity of “culture” terms exist, both in academic disciplines and in public discourse. This should be systematically considered in any attempt to formulate a research concept for cultural governance. Based on a discussion of key thinkers concerned with the relationship of culture and society (Max Weber, Antonio Gramsci, Theodor W. Adorno, Clifford Geertz, Stuart Hall), and the regulation-of-culture-approach in British Cultural Studies, a research framework of cultural governance is unfolded in the paper. While this concept should be useful in many contexts of a social-science-orientated research on cultural phenomena (i.e. the governance of cultural diversity), an exemplary concretization is offered for the governance field of cultural heritage in closing.

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1. Perspectives of social sciences-orientated research towards cultural phenomena

1.1 Introduction

This Working Paper introduces a specific concept of cultural governance as a research concept for the humanities and social sciences (esp. Section 3). As a preliminary step, it discusses the term “culture” (Section 1.2) and the concept of governance (Section 2). This discussion will be preceded by general remarks regarding social science-orientated research on culture (Section 1.1).1

The classic humanities, social and cultural anthropology, cultural studies, the social sciences, but also subsections of specific sciences such as cultural geography, all deal with the cultural, in diverse, overlapping and different ways. In the 1990s all of them were influenced by the cultural turns and the then innovative approaches of British cultural studies. “The University after Cultural Studies” was the topic of a panel held in 2009 at the spring conference of the American Cultural Studies Association. According to the conference reports, none of the participants questioned the success of the discipline; they stated that it had completely transformed the US humanities during the previous two decades. Thomas Steinfeld (2009) summarized the contributions to the conference by saying that engaging with popular culture had become the centre of attention to such an extent, in a strange linking of private passions and a great need for theory, that its success could not be ignored. In the 1990s, a term established itself in the German academic landscape, institutionally visible in book titles, and in the renaming of faculties and degree programmes, that had until then led a rather niche existence, namely that of \textit{Kulturwissenschaften}, which can be translated into English as \textit{Cultural Sciences} or better yet as \textit{Culture Sciences}. As a simple Google search shows, both combinations can be shown to exist in English, but are not very common, and they could lead to incorrect associations concerning the content of \textit{Kulturwissenschaften}. In any case, these terms should not be used interchangeably without reflection. In the German-speaking world, \textit{Kulturwissenschaften} is edging out the established term \textit{Geisteswissenschaften} (literally: sciences of the mind), which is basically the equivalent to the English humanities in terms of scope and topics, meaning the philologies and linguistics, but also, for example,

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1 This Working Paper is based on some ideas of my habilitation thesis which deals with UNESCO’s World Heritage Regime (Schmitt 2011). I would like to thank Hans-Georg Bohle (Department of Geography, University of Bonn) who encouraged me to unfold the concept of Cultural Governance.
music studies, art history, and usually also theologies and religious studies. Renaming departments is usually an expression of upheaval and conceptual reorientation, which in this case becomes visible, among other things, through the completion of the Cultural Turns and the reception of Cultural Studies. In this process, Kulturwissenschaften and Sozialwissenschaften (social sciences) to a certain extent became complementary terms, and so, within the German-speaking world, following a certainly not contradiction-free but still widely shared consensus, Kulturwissenschaften encompass not only the traditional humanities, but also Cultural and Social Anthropology – which has in some ways managed to take on the status of a leading discipline (Leitdisziplin) – as well as smaller subsections such as Cultural Geography.

This paper aims to locate the cultural within a specific social sciences perspective, namely in relation to questions of political steering and governance. In order to properly engage with this topic, I believe it is necessary to start by clarifying the central terms of culture and governance. In doing so, the paper concerns itself with a thematic field that crosses the boundaries of a number of scientific disciplines that belong, on the one hand, to the Kulturwissenschaften, and on the other hand to the Sozialwissenschaften (social sciences). Kulturwissenschaften and Sozialwissenschaften have always overlapped, as is evident from the way certain scholars are treated; thus, a thinker such as Max Weber may be found in genealogies of both disciplines. In a comparatively small discipline such as human geography, it is noticeable that, depending on the context (conference, book project, edited volume), the same person is sometimes listed as a cultural geographer and at other times as a social geographer.

In their introduction to the three-volume “Handbook of Kulturwissenschaften” (Jaeger et al. 2004/1: VII), the authors confirm the ambivalent current situation of the Kulturwissenschaften (and thereby also partially of the anglophone Humanities). On the one hand, the authors claim that the Kulturwissenschaften are gaining increasing importance for the cultural interpretation and orientation of present-day societies, while on the other hand, their subject-specific, theoretical and methodological self-understanding is by no means clear. The internationalization and interdisciplinarity of the Kulturwissenschaften discussion has made this more complex: But the Kulturwissenschaften in the sense of the German tradition of the first decades of the twentieth century clearly referred to something other than British or Anglo-American Cultural Studies or the currents of Structuralism and Post-structuralism developed in France. As a result of this confusion, the term culture is in danger of becoming a catchall which has no analytical selectivity and which is no longer capa-
ble of combining the questions and findings of the *Kulturwissenschaften* – according to the argumentation of the editors of the handbook (Jaeger et al. 2004/1: VII).

It has often been pointed out that in the famous Cultural Turn, multiple developments occurred, that were in no way consistent and sometimes even contradictory. The Cultural Turn can be divided up analytically (for example, into a Linguistic Turn, a Semiotic Turn, a Qualitative Turn, a Post-structuralist Turn), so that Blotevogel (2003: 9), for example, recommends the use of the plural form Cultural Turns, in order to express the plurality, or heterogeneity, of references to culture within different branches of the social sciences.

While certain aspects of the Cultural Turn can be considered as being broadly, other aspects of the Cultural Turn remain controversial. The debate on the relevance of the Cultural Turn, which is by no means finished, and periodically polemic, but by now clearly reified, mainly targeted critiques of

- the unconditional acceptance of post-modern and post-structuralist positions; at least, for some colleagues a “pure” post-structuralism signifies the end of all possibility for intersubjective, understandable and replicable science; see for example Weichhart (2008: Chapter 11), who presents this argument in a convincing manner
- the increasing hegemonial position of discourse analysis approaches, while, for example, some authors portray the social science view of actors and their actions or practices, or their structures and institutions, as having little relevance
- a rather “arts journalism-esque” (Klüter 2005) writing style and unscientific working style without grounded empirical research, and
- a too short-sighted narrative equating of knowledge and power, with reference to the works of Michel Foucault, which ignores other dimensions of knowledge and power (regarding this argument, see Pott 2005)
- the seemingly arbitrary choice of topics with only slight relevance to society

Similar questions have been sand still are raised in a general way in the interdisciplinary discussion on the relationship between *Sozialwissenschaften* and *Kulturwissenschaften* (cf. Jaeger et al. 2004: 1-3; and Moebius/Reckwitz 2008). These questions and topics include, among others:

- the age-old question of epistemological foundations, concerning the possibility or impossibility of *Sozialwissenschaften* and *Kulturwissenschaften*, which was posed in a new way by Post-structuralism (on the cross-disciplinary discussion that is principally in favour of Post-structuralism, see Moebius/Reckwitz 2008; a more critical assessment is to be found in Weichhart 2008),
- debates on the term “culture” and its relevance for Kulturwissenschaft-based research
- the question regarding the primacy or the equality of the discourse-oriented approach, or approaches based on agency or praxis (on the cross-disciplinary discussion, see, for example, Hörning 2004),
- the question on the differentiation or identity of Sozialwissenschaften and Kulturwissenschaften, and finally
- the question regarding the relationship of kulturwissenschaftlicher (this is the adjective form of Kulturwissenschaften) individual disciplines to a comprehensive “Kulturwissenschaft”.

For a social sciences-based study of cultural phenomena
With different types of emphasis and programmatic implementation, Lippuner (2005), Werlen (2003), Gregson (2003) or Pott (2005) have made a case for greater reference to the social sciences within cultural geography, in response to plausible critiques formulated above. The approach developed in this Working Paper is based on the idea that culture-oriented research should be firmly linked to the social sciences. In this paper, I argue for the implementation of social science-based research on cultural phenomena (and, as a geographer, particularly for a social science-based cultural geography), which will, on the one hand, investigate the reproduction of cultural phenomena, while, on the other hand, investigating the significance of cultural phenomena for social reproduction or for functional sub-sections, such as politics (Table 1). As cultural phenomena or facts we mean here offerings of sense and meaning, and on the other hand, those practices, actions and artefacts in which such offerings of sense and meaning are directly expressed (see the thorough discussion of the term “culture” in Chapter 1.2). The question of social reproduction of cultural facts can be differentiated into questions about transformation, the changing of cultural facts through social change or through social influences (including political, economic or technological influences), and the question of societal and political steering, regulation or governance of cultural facts. The approach to culture governance presented in the rest of this chapter is a specification of this kulturwissenschaftlicher goal for the investigation of the social reproduction of cultural facts.
1.2 Diversity of the term “culture” and theoretical perspectives on culture

It seems appropriate at this point to reflect upon the term “culture” before continuing the argumentation towards social science-oriented research on cultural phenomena. The Kulturwissenschaften must deal with the fact that, as a result of the history of the term, a diversity of “culture” terms exists, both in academic disciplines and in public discourse. This has at least two consequences. On the one hand, an author must ask himself which understanding of culture, or the cultural, he is presenting. The same applies to any particular paradigmatic approach. The sciences are not able, or no longer able, or are able only in relation to specific paradigms, to conclusively define their central terms with a broad consensus from the scientific community, but academic disciplines should at least be clear about their central terms – for otherwise, what would be the foundation of their own scientific praxis? On the other hand, the Kulturwissenschaften must deal with the fact that concepts of culture or the cultural exist, which they themselves do not share and which are influential in society and within their particular research fields. A series of attempts has been made over the last few years on the part of authors in the Kulturwissenschaften and in the social sciences, with the goal of tracing and systematizing the diverse meanings and the genealogy of the term “culture” (see, for example, Eagleton 2001; Reckwitz 2004). Thus, Ropers (1997: 167f.), in a first attempt, distinguishes between (1) culture in the sense of being cultivated, meaning civilized, (2) culture in the sense of creative, artistic activity, and finally (3) culture as a universal system of meaning and orientation typical of societies, organizations and groups.

A systematization of various concepts of culture, which attempts to trace their historical references, contexts and boundaries, can be found in the work of Andreas
Reckwitz (2004). Based on historical developments, Reckwitz distinguishes between four types of definition of culture:

(1) **Normative concepts of culture**, which developed during the Enlightenment and were aimed at the way of living of the new middle class with its ideals of education and the development of the individual personality. These concepts are assumed to contain “a universal standard of the cultivated, which secretly corresponds to the culture of the middle-class” (Reckwitz 2004: 4).

(2) **Totality-oriented, contextual or holistic concepts of culture**: In these variations, the concept of culture is contextualized and historicized: “Culture is no longer a specific way of living, rather, cultures are specific ways of living of individual collectives in history, and thus the concept of culture occurs in the plural” (Reckwitz 2004: 5). Prominent proponents of this concept of culture include Johann Gottfried Herder and Edward B. Tylor as one of the founding fathers of North American Cultural Anthropology. The US-American Berkeley School of Cultural Geography around C. O. Sauer can also be classified as belonging to this concept. In contrast to later oppositions of “culture” and “society”, cultures are conceived here as being territorially bound and located in a specific place, and societies are identified with one another (Reckwitz 2004: 5).

(3) **Concepts of culture based on differentiation theory, sectoral theory or functional differentiation theory**, which developed out of the normative concepts of culture through conceptual limitations. This type of concept of culture is no longer directed towards a comprehensive way of life, but towards highly cultural fields of praxis such as theatre and art. This understanding of culture continues to determine the everyday semantics of culture to this day. It describes a “socially differentiated subsystem of modern society that specializes in intellectual and aesthetic interpretations of the world”. According to Reckwitz (2004: 6), the sectoral concept of culture underwent a functionalistic reinterpretation, not least in the sociology of Talcott Parsons.

(4) **Meaning-oriented or knowledge and symbol-oriented concepts of culture**: Reckwitz subsumes under this category a series of concepts of culture, as they developed in the *Sozialwissenschaften* and *Kulturwissenschaften* during the twentieth century. Corresponding notions of culture are rooted in the approaches and work of the first half of the century, especially in phenomenology, in Ernst Cassirer’s (1923ff.) “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”, in hermeneutics, in the linguistic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and in the structural linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure. After 1950, such approaches were thematically expanded within the *Kulturwissenschaften*
(for instance from linguistic philosophy to general cultural theory), radicalized and synthesized; these approaches have remained fundamental to the kulturwissenschaftliche discussion until today and have shaped the perspectives of the Cultural Turns.

In this social constructivist view, the cultural portrays itself as those meaning systems and differentiation systems which, “in their specific form of a 'symbolic organization of reality', represent the necessary action constitutive background of social practices”, according to Reckwitz 2004: 7). For Reckwitz, this new kulturwissenschaftliche concept of culture radicalizes the contingency perspective on the cultural, which was present to varying degrees in older concepts of culture: cultural systems are historically grown and therefore also contingent; in principle, they could be shaped differently.

The construction of a meaning-oriented or knowledge and symbol-oriented concept of culture as the concept of culture of contemporary Kulturwissenschaften could obscure the fact that, in the end, several rather different concepts of culture are brought together in this category, concepts that correspond to different research goals, such as the language and discourse-oriented or praxis theory-oriented goals.

Specifications of Concepts of Culture

In his overview, cited above, Reckwitz (2004) notably fails to mention Max Weber’s notion of culture, although Weber’s notion, not least due to its reception by key authors of the Cultural Turn such as Clifford geertz, continues to play an important role in the kulturwissenschaftliche discussion to this day. It was Max weber who connected the concept of culture to the concept pair “sense and meaning”, and who, as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, clearly revealed the contingency perspective of the concept of culture as delineated by Reckwitz (2004). In his well known essay on the “objectivity” of knowledge in the social sciences and social politics, weber writes:

“‘Culture’ is a from the perspective of man a finite segment filled with sense and meaning of the meaningless infinity of world affairs” (Weber 1988, orig. 1922/1904: 180).

Weber elaborates on his notion of culture several lines later:

“Prostitution is a cultural phenomenon in the same way as religion or money, all three because and only because and only to the extent that their existence and their historical form affect our cultural interests directly or indirectly.” (Weber 1988: orig. 1922/1904: 181).2

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2 Translation by Ruth Schubert.
“Sense and meaning” are therefore dependent on the viewpoint of humans or, as the case may be, human communities; for Weber, culture is the ideational aspect of human existence. However, even as a good “Weberian”, there is no obligation to accept Weber’s notion that world affairs are a senseless infinity; this is a non-scientific and not a scientific opinion of Weber’s. Clifford Geertz’ notion of culture stands in the tradition of both Max Weber and Ernst Cassirer:

“In any case, the culture concept to which I adhere (…) denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” (Geertz 1973: 89)

In Geertz’ work, culture does not remain a pure sense and meaning matrix, but expresses itself through symbols. The Geertzian metaphor of “culture as text” (see, for example, Geertz 1983a, orig. 1972: 253) can be critiqued from the perspective of action and praxis theory. This metaphor suggests that we should see the cultural in a rarified and purified logic of symbols, codes and texts (see Hörning 2004: 140). However, this critique seems to be aimed less at Geertz himself than at his metaphor which took on a life of its own in the broader kulturwissenschaftliche reception. In Geertz it clearly has its foundation, its basis, in participatory research – and not in the dissection of discourse fragments by a scholar sitting at his desk. Thus, in his reflections on Balinese cock fights, it is not only the scenarios but also the moods, the unrestrained, wild feelings, including those of the researcher, that become vivid for the reader (see Geertz 1983a). Hörning (2004: 140) convincingly points out that the concept of culture, at least the one developed by Geertz in his older key texts such as “Thick Description” (1983, orig. 1973) or “Deep Play” (Geertz 1973), is too static: contradictions or the existence of different “ways of reading” cultural symbols tend to be disregarded.

The terms “sense” and “meaning” (German Sinn and Bedeutung), as used by Weber and Geertz, and after them by countless other authors, have different meanings, or at least a spectrum of meanings. According to my understanding, the terms “sense” and “meaning” are frequently reduced in semiotic approaches to a restricted spectrum of sense and meaning, related only to the cognitive interpretation of signs or codes. But the German word Sinn (English “sense”) also has an existential dimension, as seen in expressions such as Sinnkrise (identity crisis) or Sinnlosigkeit (futility). In Geertz’ definition, there is an echo of this existential dimension when he links cultural mea-
nings and symbols to human knowledge of life, or attitudes to life. As Johan Galtung once put it, even if somewhat tersely:

“Culture is the symbolic aspect of human existence. Culture is representation through symbols, usually optic or acoustic symbols, which are organized diachronically or synchronically” (Galtung 1998: 187).

This definition attempt by one of the most unconventional thinkers and influential social scientists emphasizes the (at least potential) existential meaning of culture, which is all too often “invisibilized” in semiotic approaches.

In addition to these definitions, there are many formulations in the more recent literature which may at first appear to be definitions, but are really controversial statements aimed at clarifying certain aspects of what is cultural. This category includes, for example, the following formulation:

“culture is the essential tool for making the other” (Abu-Loghd 1991: 146)³

or this formulation by the cultural geographer Don Mitchell:

“culture is politics by another name” (Mitchell 2000: 294).

Mitchell’s controversial equation of culture and politics seems particularly questionable if it is taken too seriously, too literally, in other words when it is understood as a kind of definition, or, in the language of Immanuel Kant, as a synthetic judgement. It is sometimes stimulating (even though much too imprecise) for scholarly research, in as far as it shows that the cultural and the political are, or can be, interlinked in many different ways. Awareness of this fact is a basic feature of the approach to cultural governance presented here. However, with such a simple equation it is not possible to do justice to cultural or political practices, or their scholarly study.

The cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996: 13) pleads in favour of an “adjectival approach to culture, which stresses its contextual, heuristic, and comparative dimensions and orients us to the idea of culture as difference”. The use of the substantive culture makes Appadurai share responsibility for the development of an inappropriate substantialization of the cultural in scholarly thought (loc. cit.: 12). This concern is taken into account in the concept of cultural governance.

The dimension of the cultural, as understood in this conception, moves between the level of fabrics of sense and meaning, and the level of practices (such as rituals, performances), works, and material (or digital) artefacts in which these fabrics of

sense and meaning find expression. Cultural practices and artefacts can be, but do not have to be, expressions of existential meaning.

**Reflections on the linking of Kulturwissenschaften with the social sciences**

The *Kulturwissenschaften* and the social sciences cannot be strictly separated, either conceptionally or empirically, with respect to the institutions and scholars who represent them. While culture and society largely coincided in functionalist or structuralist approaches, for instance in the anthropological studies of Lévi-Strauss, we will consider culture and society here as two poles of a conceptual field, as reciprocal and indispensable corresponding concepts (Eickelpasch 1997: 12; see also Lippuner 2005) which are directly related to each other. While such an approach is still meaningful today, it comes from an old tradition. Thus, the *kulturwissenschaftlich* category of sense, which became a central concept with and after Max Weber, occupies a prominent place in his theory of action. If “*kulturwissenschaftlich*” and “social science-oriented” perspectives are also distinguished, in addition to “culture” and “society”, a situation arises which is only apparently a paradox, where (1) “social” issues are investigated from perspectives normally associated with the *Kulturwissenschaften*, or (2) research in the “cultural” field is firmly tied to theoretical approaches borrowed from the social sciences.

Reckwitz (2004) has developed a *kulturwissenschaftlich* research programme (which is, however, not unproblematic), based on the so-called contingency perspective, or the idea that cultural phenomena are always contingent and could always be otherwise. This programme is one-sided in that it ignores the fact that cultural phenomena, as a result of their historical evolution, always contain orders, reflect orders, and are interwoven in complex ways with other cultural phenomena. This *kulturwissenschaftlich* research programme can be opposed to a *sozialwissenschaftlich* (social science-oriented) research programme (for a discussion of culture from a sociological perspective, see for instance Cappai 2001). I propose a basic “integrated” perspective for social science-based research in the *Kulturwissenschaften*, a perspective which uses prominent social-science approaches such as action and practice theories, or Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens 1984), as well as ideas from historical and sociological neo-institutionalism (see Hall/Taylor 1996; Scott 2008). Within this conception, however, a special position will be accorded to the cultural sphere and

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4 *Kulturwissenschaftlich* is the adjective form of the noun *Kulturwissenschaften*.
5 *Sozialwissenschaftlich* is the adjective form of the noun *Sozialwissenschaften* (German for social sciences).
explicit concepts and ideas. Institutions are reproduced through agency or practices; in them ideas and concepts are expressed.

**Fig. 1: Key points of the proposed basic conception for social research, especially for social and cultural geography**

*Ideas and concepts*

In the basic conception proposed here, explicit emphasis is laid on the importance of ideas and concepts in order to expand a purely *sozialwissenschaftlich*, structuration-theory-based perspective into a basic conception that can also be usefully applied to *kulturwissenschaftlich* research.

Ideas and concepts can be seen as nodes in the fabric of sense and meaning with which attempts have often been made to define the concept of culture. It is not necessary to refer to Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Gramsci 1991) in order to underline the importance of ideas for the shaping of societies and the way people act. The theme of showing the importance of ideas for societies played a central role in the work of Max Weber. Without taking up an idealist position, Weber refused to believe that ideas and culture are completely subordinate to the economic situation, as claimed in orthodox Marxism:

“People’s actions are directly controlled by interests (material and ideal), not by ideas. But: ‘worldviews’ created by ‘ideas’ have very often set the direction in which the dynamic of the interests pushed the actions” (Weber 1920: 252).

As Gabriele Cappai (2001: 81) puts it in her interpretation of Max Weber, the realization of ideas “always depends on a specific social context”, “which from time to

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6 Translation by Ruth Schubert.
time can facilitate, impede or even prevent the implementation of these ideas.” She finds that “Weber’s great sociological achievement is that in any concrete historical case he can show which actors help a specific idea to find its ‘way’ into the world, how this idea becomes established despite the resistance of ‘natural’ dispositions and existing socio-cultural circumstances, and how it finally becomes implemented in institutional terms.”

In daily actions, in daily practice, ideas and concepts function as cognitive schemata; they can be tied to institutions (as demonstrated for instance by the fact that historical and sociological neo-institutionalists show an interest in ideas), but they can be separated analytically from institutions. An idea or concept such as that of World Heritage can “exist” (i.e. can occur in texts, discourses, reflections, etc.) without necessarily being reflected in institutions.

Concepts or ideas thus have a twofold dialectical relationship with human agency on the one hand, and institutions on the other hand: concepts or ideas have a discursive influence on human agency, shaping actions, whether consciously, practically or unconsciously (see also Giddens 1984, Werlen 1997: 153). However, when actors take up ideas and appropriate them for themselves, they can change them, or they can create new ideas; they do not always have to act as passive recipients and actualizers of discourses. There is also a dialectical relationship between ideas and concepts on the one hand, and institutions on the other hand; but strictly speaking this relationship is always mediated by human agency. Political institutions (such as UNESCO) can take up and spread ideas, and can also reshape them. Ideas and institutions mutually “frame” each other (for a neo-Gramscian view, see Bøås/McNeill 2004).

Ideas, symbols, concepts constitute one pole of the cultural sphere, while the other pole is made up of actions and practices (especially rituals and performances) and the material (or digital) artefacts in which concepts, ideas, senses and meanings are manifested.

Following this outline of the social science-oriented or basic kulturwissenschaftlich conception proposed here, we will now proceed to discuss the concept of cultural governance, i.e. the governance of what is cultural, a medium-range concept.
2. The concept of governance

The topic of governance has given rise to a great amount of literature in the social sciences. It has in common with other academic “buzz words”, such as sustainability, that it has gained a normative charge, at least within its semantic field, for instance in the combination good governance. When new concepts appear in the social and political sciences, this can be due to any of several reasons: (1) older concepts are perceived as being deficient, (2) in the eyes of scholars, the social and political circumstances have been transformed in such a way that new terms are needed to describe them, (3) scholars wish to distinguish themselves, and/or (4) social actors outside academia have a particular interest in the spread of a concept. With reference to the concept of governance, all four of these points may be applicable.

Concepts of governance grew up in the Anglophone academic world in the 1980s and 1990s, although the term also appears in older texts, for instance in Ruggie (1975). The term governance was modelled on but deliberately distinct from the term government, in the sense of a formal government or system of government. Both terms are derived from the Latin gubernare (steer [ships], but also control, govern), which in turn comes from the Greek verb kybernein, which means steering in the navigational sense (see also Stokke 1997: 28). The increasing use of governance – by scholars in the social and political sciences, as well as by politicians and political institutions – can be seen as a reaction to the fact that the traditional terms of sovereignty and government no longer appeared suitable for describing processes of making binding decisions and enforcing them in the present era, which is sometimes referred to as the second modern age, and sometimes as late or post modernity. And this applies to political steering in local and regional contexts, as well as in the sphere of international politics.

Governance and government

On the one hand, the term governance marks a distinction from the notion of government in the form of a legal ruling power that is based on an administrative apparatus, while on the other hand governance as a more general term includes the concept of government. It is used in this last sense in much of the literature produced in the social sciences and political sciences, and also in this Working Paper.

The remarks made by Rosenau (1992) are helpful for any discussion of the concept of governance:
“Governance (...) is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms (...). Governance is thus a system of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters. Put more emphatically, governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects), whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies” (Rosenau 1992: 4f.).

In Rosenau (1992), governance and government are treated neither as complete opposites nor as a hierarchy, one being subordinate to the other. Analytically, or from a formal point of view, his formulations are problematical; on the one hand, for Rosenau, governance includes state (governmental) institutions, while on the other hand governance and government are seen as polar opposites, as different forms of steering. Government involves formal means of exercising power, while governance, on the other hand, means a communal system of rule on the basis of common convictions. By referring to different forms of rule, Rosenau was able to trigger important debates, and to raise questions which, however, he is not able to answer satisfactorily; for obeying an order issued by a government always contains an element of voluntariness. Anyone who receives such an order can always decide not to obey it, provided he or she is prepared to take the consequences (which of course can be horrific, at least in totalitarian dictatorships) (see for instance Galtung 1987: 118). Conversely, outside idealized models of forms of governance, there are always some elements of gentle pressure or force, at least when the forms of governance remain stable over a certain period of time.

A prescriptive concept of governance (see for instance Commission on Global Governance 1995: 4) may be appropriate and useful in political contexts, such as the important report of the World Commission on Global Governance calling for the establishment of a global order. But in the context of research in the social sciences, it is problematic. In such research, it is fully legitimate to measure political practices and institutions against normative standards; but a concept that is normatively charged cannot be used as a general term for the description and analysis of observed facts. It is better to describe a governance structure first, and then subject it, if necessary, to a normative evaluation, instead of using a positively connoted concept from the start.

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7 This is only possible when the normative concept can be thought of as part of a two-pole pair of concepts that defines a continuum, such as peace and violent conflict, or integration and disintegration. Such a construction is not possible when governance is used as the more general term and includes government.
Governance and regulation

The concept of governance shows differences from, but also possibilities of referring to, the concept of regulation and the various regulation theories. The concept of regulation can be used in a rather unspecific sense, such as in general system theory and cybernetics (for an introduction, see Vester 1983). In the political sciences, the term regulation usually means the binding regulation of social problems through political decisions by means of incentives, requirements, prohibitions, ordinances and laws (Dreher 2002: 804). The regulation school, which originated in France, sought to explain the alternation of crisis and temporary stabilization in capitalist societies. During (temporarily) stable economic phases, social institutions serve to regulate relations between consumption and the regime of accumulation; their interaction is referred to as the regulation regime. A regulation theory in this sense is not a general theory of society; it is applicable only to modern capitalist societies and its analytical capability has explicit chronological and spatial limits (Aglietta 1979: 22). In recent studies, for instance of the regulation of societal relations to nature, use of the concept of regulation is fuzzy and ambiguous, oscillating between the general political concept of regulation based on system theory, and that of the economic regulation school which originated in France.

The regulation theory (of French provenance) and the concept of governance can both be located in the field of institutionalist theory (Simonis 2007: 212). In some authors, such as Bob Jessop (2002), the two concepts are used largely synonymously, or there are mutual references between the two lines of theory and discussion (Simonis 2007: 212). Beyond their common origin in institutionalist theories, the concept of governance explicitly allows the inclusion of actor- and action-centred perspectives in the analysis of social steering processes, more so than that of regulation: from such a perspective, social steering takes place not only through anonymous social institutions, but through concrete, namable, and not necessarily interchangable actors. There is an area of overlap between the general concept of regulation as used in political science, and the concept of governance. It is thus justifiable to consider them as synonymous in certain contexts (but not in all contexts!). It is better to use the concept of regulation in those cases or analyses where emphasis is on the social steering of particular fields according to routine patterns, while the concept of governance is better for cases where attention is centred on active processes of negotiation between actors.

Simonis (2007: 212) notes two other differences between the governance approach and regulation theory: (1) While the concept of governance is ahistorical and uni-
versalistic, and can therefore be applied to other ages and to non-capitalist societies (see also Adger/Jordan 2009: 11), regulation theory argues historically and materi-}

**Schmitt:**

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versalistic, and can therefore be applied to other ages and to non-capitalist societies (see also Adger/Jordan 2009: 11), regulation theory argues historically and materia-

listically. It is thus legitimate to inquire into governance (for instance, governance of the way an important resource like water is managed), in societies such as that of the M’zab valley in the Algerian Sahara (Schmitt 2008), in which forms of steering ranging from the traditional and collective to those of the modern capitalist state are superimposed on each other. However, it must be noted that the emergence and popularity of the concept of governance also marks more recent historical develop-

ments, especially that of the increasing importance of non-state actors in interna-

tional politics, as well as regional and local politics.

Simonis’ (2007) first objection is not valid if a general social-science concept of regulation is used, rather than the specific concept defined by the regulation school; this general concept can usefully be applied to pre-modern or hybrid societies, such as that of the M’zab valley. Simonis (2007: 212f.) also underlines that (2) the price paid for the openness of the governance approach is that it is unable to offer any explanation for the emergence of, or changes in, forms of governance, in contrast to the regulation school; it is an analytical concept and not a material medium-range theory in respect of social processes. Conceptional thinness is thus the consequence of its flexibility and openness.

The regulation school uses the concept of *mode de régulation* (mode of regulation). Swyngedouw (1997) defines this as those practices which define the dynamic repro-

duction of, and changes in, social relationships. Each mode of regulation is thus charac-

terized by a set of formal and informal practices; according to Simonis (2007: 215), it is an institutionalized macro-social coordination mechanism. The dominant mode of regulation in a particular society develops from social debates over the learning processes involved in successful overcoming economic crises. By analogy, we can regard different modes of governance as practices of governance which have proved to work well. Measuring the extent to which particular modes of governance are the result of successfully overcoming crises, requires critical historical reconstruc-

tion, and cannot be forecast beforehand. And situations can arise in which existing forms of governance prove to be inappropriate for overcoming certain crises.

**Governance as analytical concept versus normative category**

Governance is understood here as an analytical concept for describing political pro-

cesses of negotiation and steering (see also Meckling 2004: 51). More so than “regu-

lation”, “governance” stresses the conscious negotiation and steering of situations
by actors. Hyden et al. (2004: 26f.) raise the question of whether a concrete form of governance should be treated as a dependent or an independent variable. Any concrete form of governance is embedded in a wider historical, socio-cultural and economic context, and as a rule specific forms of governance build on earlier forms of governance or regimes (see Hyden et al. 2004: 27). Nevertheless, the influence of the context, for instance, can become reduced in the course of the process of governance, or the process of governance can at least partially change these originally given “contexts”.

Some governance approaches follow a very application-related perspective in the sense of working out possibilities for “better” social and political steering in a particular political field (see for instance Renn 2009). Such an application-oriented approach to problem solving is not at the basis of the cultural governance approach; however, a greater theoretical penetration may be beneficial to practitioners in the corresponding field of governance.

2.1 A general analytical framework for reconstruction of governance processes from the perspective of the social sciences

A comprehensive analytical framework for the reconstruction of governance processes is shown below (Tab. 2). Since the concept of governance can cover a broad spectrum of forms of political steering – from largely hierarchy-free negotiations, according to Habermas’ ideal of communicative action (Habermas 1981), to the borderline case of social steering in totalitarian regimes – the application of the concept of governance to certain situations has at first little significance. It is therefore necessary to be able to describe a process of governance or governance structure more precisely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical level</th>
<th>Selected aspects of the analytical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Object of governance** (sectoral dimension, issue orientation; in constructivist terms: framing) | – identification of the field of governance to be studied  
– from a constructivist perspective: study of the framing of the particular field of governance |
<p>| Related, sometimes competing fields of governance or regimes | – identification of those fields of governance which in practice have areas of overlap with the field of governance to be studied |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical level</th>
<th>Selected aspects of the analytical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Involved/affected actors/subjects and their actions/practices and perceptions** | – identification of (key) actors and subjects in the field of governance to be studied  
– routine practices and/or intentional behaviour of these actors  
– formulated and unformulated interests and goals (especially in respect of field of governance, governance process, anchoring in the governance structure)  
– resources/power potentials/capital  
– action constraints |
| **Institutions and rules** (including organized collective actors and organizations) | – formal and informal institutions or rules  
– formal/ juristic versus empirical power of institutions to act and to organize |
| “**Embeddedness**” of the governance structure | Higher structures and institutions in which the governance structure is embedded. These structures may appear to be given, but often they can be changed and change themselves over time. |
| **Exogenous processes/developments** | (Initially) exogenous processes and developments that influence the object of governance. The question is how far these can be “internalized” in the governance. |
| **Governance structure and modes of governance** | – Top-down regulation and hierarchical coordination, in extreme cases even authoritarian or totalitarian steering, versus self-organization, steering by direct democracy or equal consultation, bottom-up steering, steering by networks and cliques  
– coordination by market and/or regulations and/or interventions  
– role of scales for governance structure; possibility of multi-level governance  
– role of networks |
| **Leading ideas/concepts or discourses associated with the fields of governance** | – identification of relevant ideas/discourses in the field of governance and in overlapping fields of governance  
– relationship between these ideas (e.g. complementary or conflictive) and their comparative position (e.g. hegemonic or marginalized)  
– importance of the ideas for the process of governance (e.g. as the driving force of action) |
| **Governance culture** | – trust versus mistrust between actors, their different points of view, views of the governance process, degree to which oriented by normative goals and procedural rules  
– opportunities for civil society actors to influence governance processes and results |
Analytical level | Selected aspects of the analytical level
--- | ---
Governance processes | – negotiation processes in relation to the field of governance
– changes in governance structures or modes (e.g. changes in the actor structure, introduction of new rules)
Outcomes, effectiveness | – physical and substantial, material, geospatial, energetic outcomes
– institutional and juristic outcomes, establishment of rules
– social, monetary, economic, political and cultural effects
– desired and undesired or unintentional effects (a) in respect of the formulated goals of governance, and (b) from the point of view of the actors
– efficiency of governance with regard to set goals
Normative aspects of a governance analysis | (a) with regard to governance structure and process:
– principles of appropriate representation or participation of all those who are involved or affected
– procedural transparency and legitimacy, opportunities for assigning responsibilities
(b) with regard to the outcome of governance
– compliance with principles of justice and other norms regarded as universal (especially recognized human rights, social rights)
– gender rights, sustainability
– (other points, depending on the field of governance and research question)

Tab. 2: A general framework for the analysis of fields of governance
Prepared by the author

In what follows, the analytical levels briefly presented in Table 2 will be discussed in greater detail.

Object of governance (sectoral dimension, issue orientation)
The specific names given to governances are normally based on either different political fields or areas (such as cultural governance, environmental governance, risk governance), or territorial or administrative units (such as local governance, global governance, landscape governance). These are areas which are socially constituted, and in certain cases constituting the particular area socio-politically may even be one of the main goals of the particular governance structure. The most interesting aspect from a constructivist perspective is the framing of the field of governance by actors serving their own interests (see Bernecker 2005).
Connected, overlapping and in some cases competing fields of governance
The governance of a special area, for instance in the form of a regime, always has a certain relation to other areas and processes. In the real social world, governance fields overlap and may compete with each other (as in the case of conservation management and urban development). The overlapping area constitutes a new governance field or arena (such as urban governance), in which the relationship between these different governance fields is negotiated. Different political fields frequently have conflicting goals, and therefore require a further negotiation process, or governance process, in respect of achieving these goals. As a rule, competing governance fields are reflected in incompatible discourses. The analysis of sectoral governance must thus include an analysis of competing governance fields, together with their central actors and subjects, institutions and ideas. A good example is the “eternal” institutional and discursive dispute between conservation management and urban development, or the competing points of view which see cultural productions either as cultural goods or commercial services, as revealed in the debates on the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.

Social actors, agency, practices and perceptions
In any governance analysis, a prominent place must be given to discussion of the actors – collective social actors such as authorities and decision-making bodies, but also the individual actors working in them, with their perceptions, goals and interests, routine practices, choices and constraints.

Institutions and rules
Institutions and rules can be understood as a special level in the analysis of governance processes. Governance analyses are based on an institutionalist theory paradigm (Simonis 2007: 212). Historical and sociological neo-institutionalism serve here as a basis for the discussion of institutions in governance processes (Hall/Taylor 1996; Scott 2008).

Governance structure and modes of governance
The governance structure or mode of governance can be considered as the aggregated analytical description of the institutional constitution of a governance. The market, the hierarchy or negotiation dialogues can be regarded as idealizing, fundamental forms of coordination of a governance; in reality, mixed forms can frequently be observed. Top-down regulation corresponds to the classical image of govern-
ment; totalitarian regimes are an extreme case of top-down steering. In addition to this, there are other possibilities, such as a system largely based on self-organization, steering through forms of direct democracy or equal consultation. Corresponding structures are associated with the concept of governance in a more narrow sense. Informal networks or cliques can steer a form of governance, even when there is no formal provision for such network structures. In addition to the mode of operation of institutions, other structural moments are also significant for the formation of a governance structure, for instance the availability of certain technologies for communication and face-to-face exchanges in global governance.

A particular governance process is not entirely determined by sets of rules such as laws or international conventions. Moreover, they are as a rule embedded in a more comprehensive set of rules and customs (for instance those of international diplomacy). Finally, it is possible that sets of rules no longer function as the driving force of actions in the particular field of governance, or that they are interpreted in a way that is opposed to their original purpose.

**Ideas/concepts and discourses**

A governance perspective gives priority to the analysis of negotiation over a view of social and cultural phenomena purely in terms of discourse analysis, in which speakers are regarded as exchangeable articulators of discourses, while discourses undergo ontological charging. Nevertheless, governance processes are as a rule constituted around the fundamental and concrete recognition and implementation of norms and ideas; competing ideas, varied according to specific places or processes, come together in them (see the treatment of ideas and concepts in ch. 1.2). The discussion of ideas within the framework of a governance analysis can use the methods of discourse analysis, but should avoid absolutizing the discursive level for the understanding of social processes. It is important to show the genealogy of ideas, their variations and their specific effect in the governance process to be studied, whether as the driving force of action or in the shaping of institutions (ch. 1.2).

Key concepts and sets of rules in governance processes can be interpreted differently and correspondingly altered over time. Thus, for example, ‘outstanding universal value’ is the key concept of the World Heritage Convention (unesco 1972), but is subject to different interpretations even within the global arena of world heritage governance (Schmitt 2009; 2011). It is important to examine such conceptional shifts and competing interpretations of concepts, from both a political and a practical point of view.
**Governance culture**

The neologism “governance culture” is linked here to the established concept of political culture. For example, by (local) political interpretative culture, Karl Rohe (1987) understands the “sum of the – local – dominating problem-defining and problem-structuring interpretative models given in any particular case for the problem perception of an individual, or of a collective”, and for problem definition in public discourses (Anhut 2000: 462). The concept of governance culture refers to two connected, but analytically separable aspects:

1. Similar to the above understanding of political culture, a **field-defining and problem-defining governance culture** can refer to the customs which dominate in respect of the choice of problems to be solved. One possible thesis (to be tested empirically in each case) is that in the core institutions of a governance regime, relatively uniform views are reproduced in this respect, while, for instance on the “lower” levels of a multi-level governance system, different discourses or political fields meet in various arenas and a dominating view, in the sense of higher regime concepts, first has to become established, or is prevented due to the hegemonic positions of other discourses.

2. A **procedural governance culture** is related to the dominant action pattern and attitudes that make up the mutual relations between the actors, and to the question of which forms of coordination they aspire to. It is conceivable, for instance, that a dominant group of actors aims at achieving solutions through dialogue or consensus, while others aggressively try to exploit their power potential by imposing their own views and interests in an authoritarian manner. A procedural governance culture is basically accessible to a normative valuation.

As a rule, governance cultures are not homogeneous within a multi-level governance system, such as an international regime, but should be thought of as being dependent on a specific place, scale or arena, even when it possible to identify overarching features and tendencies in the individual governance cultures.

**Governance processes**

Governance structures are subject to change and thus processual. The expression “governance process” is related in its meaning to the concept of *politics* in political science, and can refer to two areas: firstly, negotiation processes in the particular field of governance (analogous to the term *policy*), and secondly the rules, institutions, structures and constitutions according to which the governance is organized (analogous to *polity*). These rules and structures can be changed, either explicitly
through negotiation processes, or insidiously through gradual changes in everyday practice. It is conceivable that new actors enter the governance process and change it substantially. An example of this would be an expansion of the G7 or G8 group in international politics to form a G20. Even when the constitution of a governance structure is formally unchanged, it can be altered through changes in practice. An example here is the “Round Table” between the civil rights movement and the state and party leadership in the GDR, which *de facto* ruled the GDR for several months in 1989/90, even though the constitution remained formally unchanged.

**Outcomes of governance**

Unlike policy analyses and studies based on regime theory, governance analyses are in many cases not concerned with the material effects so much as the reconstruction of processual and institutional correlations of political negotiations. Nevertheless, it seems justifiable and useful to include in governance analyses a consideration of the effects of different forms of governance. For this purpose, relevant notions from policy research or regime theories can be used. In a first step, it is possible to distinguish

1. physical and material, spatial and energetic effects, as well as social (socio-cultural, economic) effects on the affected subjects
2. institutional, especially political and juristic effects, and
3. discursive effects of governance processes

(Jänicke et al. 1999: 62-65). It is also possible to use concepts from effect analysis in policy research.

**Normative aspects of governance analysis**

Effect analysis alone of governance processes can take on a decidedly normative character. Normative questions can concern, for instance, the “material” results of the governance, but also the governance process and the governance structure on which it is based. This includes questions about the fair representation or participation of all those who are involved or affected, procedural transparency and legitimacy, and the possibility of clear accountability. The question of compliance with norms considered to be universal, such as human rights, including gender rights, can be raised in the effect analysis and in the procedural analysis. In such an analysis, the normative aspect of the concept of governance appears again, as it is known from terms such as good governance.
3. Cultural Governance

At first glance, cultural governance appears to be no different from any other sectoral field of governance, such as environmental governance or risk governance. However, in view of the central position of the concept of culture in the social sciences and Kulturwissenschaften or humanities (ch. 1), we must be cautious here. If culture is understood as a code, as a reference to overarching sense and meaning relationships in human practices and institutions, then a cultural-governance approach would be equivalent to a reconstruction of the social steering of the production of sense and meaning. Such an approach would provide a specific form of access to central questions in the social sciences and the Kulturwissenschaften. If, on the other hand, cultural governance is taken as referring to the everyday term of (high) culture, then a cultural-governance approach would be restricted to the reconstruction of politico-social steering of institutions or areas such as theatre, opera, art and classical music. If we add film and media, popular music, and perhaps language and education, we have approximately the same field that is generally subject to cultural policies (see for instance Auswärtiges Amt 2007); in this case, we would be dealing with a sectoral understanding of cultural governance. Different cultural concepts (see ch. 1.2) can thus be set against corresponding understandings of cultural governance (Tab. 3); depending on which concept of culture is taken as the basis, “narrow” and “wide” concepts of cultural governance are conceivable. The order in which the items are mentioned in Table 3 reflects an attempt to take this aspect into account, but it should not be taken as dogmatic. Moreover, the items named do not represent fully disjoint areas, but areas which may overlap. “Film”, for instance, can be both an artistic medium and a product of the “culture industry”.

3.1 A genealogy of ideas about cultural governance

The cultural-governance approach involves a comparatively new concept, and can therefore claim to regard its objects from a certain new perspective. But academic reflection on the social, political or economic steering of cultural phenomena is as old as sociology as an academic discipline for the study of “modern” societies. Thus, the approach to cultural governance is part of a long tradition in the social sciences of reflecting on culture and its relationship to social sub-areas such as politics and the economy. It is not the intention of the present study to co-opt older theoretical traditions into the service of the concept of cultural governance. It is plausible to
Possible objects of cultural governance

→ Institutions and performances/reproductions of established high culture, especially museums, theatre, opera, literature
→ Cultural heritage
→ Film, television, modern or contemporary music and architecture, as well as established minor art forms of an explicitly artistic nature
→ Popular culture, folk culture, traditional (non-Western) cultural forms, cultural forms of expression in the lower social strata
→ Film, television, music industry, internet culture, mass media, “culture industry”
→ Religion, religious forms of expression
→ Languages and cultural forms of expression in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, or colonized societies, including marginalized and suppressed cultural and religious traditions
→ Production of symbols, and creation of sense and meaning, in “non-cultural” (in the general sense) social spheres: economy, politics

weekly concept of cultural governance

Table 3: Different objects of cultural governance, depending on which concept of culture is used
(see also Schmitt 2009; Schmitt 2011)

assume that in the long term the academic discussion will go beyond the concept of governance and replace it by new conceptions. But reflection on the social steering of culture will continue as long as the social sciences continue to exist. In this modest sense, and in full awareness of the contingency of our own choice of concept, we will attempt to outline some of the stations in sociological thought on the social steering of culture, based on an admittedly small number of authors and theoretical traditions.

Max Weber
Max Weber’s concept of culture has already been discussed in ch. 1.2. For Weber, the “cultural meaning” of an object is attributed to it by the individual, the society, the researcher or the scientific community. Max Weber left us nothing that we could take
as a conception of cultural governance *avant la lettre*. But in his studies, for instance on the sociology of religion, and in his conceptional reflections, his work shows what complex interrelations exist between the political, the economic, and, for instance, the religious spheres. The originality of Weber’s thought, according to Gabriele Cappai (2001: 80), can also be seen in the fact that he distanced himself equally from historical materialism, which interpreted social and cultural realities as the product of economic relations in the “vulgar” Marxist base-superstructure model, and from idealist notions, which considered society and its historical development purely as an expression of the influence of ideas. Weber regards both perspectives as one-sided, but accepts them as legitimate driving forces for research, provided they are thought of as being not absolute, but complementary, or as limited and incomplete “medium-range” approaches, and not as comprehensive theories (Cappai 2001: 80). For social research as a whole, and therefore also for attempts at the study of cultural governance, Weber proposes that the interplay of social processes between ideas, institutions, and actors or actions/practices, should be carefully observed, and not identified on the basis of conceptional prejudices before empirical analysis.

A sober view, in Weber’s sense, may be helpful in considering theoretical approaches that tend to regard the relationship between culture and other social areas from a certain perspective only. Besides traditional Marxism, this also includes consistent formulations of neo-Gramscianism.

*Antonio Gramsci*

The unorthodox Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) did not formulate a closed social and cultural theory of his own; this was the programme of the (neo-) Gramscians, who took Gramsci’s proposals as the starting point for their reflections on the role of culture and ideas, not only in national politics, but also, by transference, in international politics.

At the beginning of the 1980s, after reading Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, the political scientist Robert Cox rendered the concept of hegemony fruitful for the theory of international relations (IR) in a new way, and in a way distinct from “realistic” understandings of hegemony. As an unorthodox Marxist, Antonio Gramsci reflected on the concept of hegemony with respect to the political processes in Europe after the Bolshevist revolution. One question which occupied Gramsci in the 1920s was that the bourgeoisie as the ruling class in Western Europe – unlike in pre-revolu-

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tionary Russia – was supported not only by the institutional coercive apparatus of the state; according to Gramsci’s analysis, it also had the concepts and ideas which ensured its privileged position, for instance the concepts of private property and the capitalist economy. These concepts were also anchored in the heads of the middle and lower social strata, by means of social institutions such as the Church, schools and the media. Gramsci described the position of the bourgeoisie as hegemonic; the essential concepts which supported the position of the bourgeoisie, were accepted by the lower social classes. However, according to Gramsci, this acceptance obliged the middle-class élite to make allowances for the interests of the working class and the lower middle class, which led to the emergence of different forms of social democracy, so that capitalism appeared acceptable to the lower social classes (see Cox 1996, orig. 1986: 126). The power supporting the ruling class was not only that of the state apparatus with its coercive instruments, but also that of consensual hegemony. For Gramsci, such a hegemony is sufficient to ensure the compliancy of the majority of people in most situations (Cox 1996a: 127).

Antonio Gramsci is important for reflections on cultural governance because he developed specific ideas about the function of cultural institutions within society. His ideas offer promising approaches for broad concepts of cultural governance (see Tab. 3), or which culture different social groups see as providing basic structures of sense and meaning. But these approaches are problematic if read in the manner of orthodox Marxism, i.e. the cultural sphere alone is interpreted as an instrument of material interests, analogous to orthodox Marxism. In respect of neo-Gramscianism, the same reserve is to be recommended as Max Weber adopted with regard to a one-sided historical materialism. Gramsci does not provide the social sciences with a general model of cultural governance, but he shows how, in certain historical situations, specific cultural hegemonies can arise and become powerful in societies.

*Frankfurt school: mass culture, culture and administration*

The Frankfurt school produced some of what are still the most influential studies, devoted to a consideration of the position of art and cultural production under the conditions of “modern” capitalist societies. These studies showed how the emergence of new technical media, such as film, radio, and finally television, affected cultural and artistic production and cultural perception patterns. The authors of the “critical” theory of the Frankfurt school had experienced such different socio-cultural contexts as the Weimar period, the Nazi regime, US-American exile (with its Hollywood cinema culture), and the early Federal Republic. Cultural production was
not only changed by the new technologies, as the title of Walter Benjamin’s (1981, orig. 1936) well known essay might suggest: “The work of art in the age of its technical reproducibility”. Above all, it was the capitalist mode of production which used the new technologies to exploit cultural production to an unheard of degree for its own profit-making purposes, and thus created a “mass culture”; in the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (2002, orig. 1947), Horkheimer and Adorno introduced the metaphorical concept of the “culture industry”, which later found its way into UNESCO documents. The first remarkable thing is that, far from rejecting traditional and modern high culture and art as the expression and attempted legitimation of exploitative social relations, in the manner of vulgar Marxism, Adorno shows appreciation of them. For Adorno, culture and art can take up a position that is critical of society. Adorno defends the concept of the autonomous work of art, which organizes itself as “meaningful and consistent” in accordance with its “immanent laws” (Adorno 1997a, orig. 1965/1967: 370); the cultural sphere thus has its own value. For him, the sociology of art, as its name suggests, deals with all aspects of art and society; this means especially the social effects and non-effects of art (loc. cit.: 367), but also the manifold social backgrounds of the development of art (loc. cit.: 371). The products of the culture industry have little in common with the work of art which obeys its own laws. The historical novelty brought about by the phenomenon of the culture industry was that it transferred “the naked profit motive to the cultural creation” (Adorno 1997, orig. 1963: 338). It is true that in earlier times artistic production frequently enabled the artist to earn a living, so that the work of art had a partially goods-like character, even before the age of technology and capitalism. Works of art produced “in the style of the culture industry [on the other hand] are not also goods, but they are goods through and through” (loc. cit., emphasis in original). In accordance with the aims of the critical theory, Adorno directs his main attention towards the social consequences of the emergence of a mass culture shaped by capitalist interests, which he characterizes as “anti-enlightenment”, or “mass deception”, and which has a regressive effect on the individual (loc. cit.: 344f.). The culture industry “tends to surround and capture the awareness of the public from all sides” (Adorno 1997b, orig. 1953: 507). The representation of objects in the culture industry has an effect on the objects themselves; the designated object is changed by its designation as a product of the culture industry:
“The colour film demolishes the cosy old inn more than bombs ever could: the film destroys its imago. No homeland can survive its treatment in the films that celebrate it” (Adorno 1997, orig. 1965/1967: 342).\(^9\)

“Artists” such as actors, for instance, continue to be involved in the production of the culture industry; the production process is not free of conflicts; as a rule, capitalist profit interests win over artistic interests. The “social, technical, artistic aspects” of cultural production “cannot be treated in isolation” (Adorno 1997b, orig. 1953: 507). They influence cultural forms, their content and their social effects.

In an essay published in 1960, Adorno dealt with a different topic, which is important for an understanding of cultural governance, namely the relationship between “culture and administration.” Adorno begins with a sentence which is (and especially at that time was) surprising: “Whoever says culture, also says administration, whether he wants to or not” (Adorno 1972, orig. 1960: 122). Adorno first justified this with the argument that the “joining together of such different things as philosophy and religion, science and art, conduct of life and customs” under the single term of culture, betrays “the administrative eye”, “which collects, classifies, weighs, organizes all this, from above” (loc. cit.); there are parallels here between the critical theory of the early 1960s and Foucault’s later ideas. Thus, political and administrative institutions conceptually “frame” cultural production. In this essay, Adorno refers to a concept of culture in the sense of middle-class high culture, including avant-garde art; in contrast to “Dialectic of Enlightenment”, he is less interested here in the mass culture of the culture industry that is steered by capitalism. In this essay, Adorno goes on to say that culture “is the opposite of administration, especially in German eyes. It aspires to be something higher and more pure, something that is untouched, that has not been cut to shape in order to satisfy certain tactical or technical considerations” (Adorno 1972, orig. 1960: 122).

For Adorno, this administration, or, as one might put it, the political and social governance of culture, is on the one hand insolubly problematic: culture suffers “when it is planned and administered” (loc. cit.: 123). However, Adorno then takes a surprisingly positive turn regarding the relationship or the “dialectic of culture and administration” (loc. cit.: 127): if culture is not administered and “if it is left to itself”, then there is a risk that “everything cultural” will lose “not only the opportunity to be effective, but its very existence” (loc. cit.: 123). The administration in capitalist societies, meaning as a rule the executive bodies of the state or local authorities, can

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\(^9\) Translation by Ruth Schubert.
create the conditions in which culture can survive, at least in niches, outside market conditions and manipulated mass taste. Towards the end of his essay, Adorno (1972: 145) comes to the conclusion: “If the administered world has to be understood as one in which there are no longer any secret retreats, it can on the other hand, by virtue of the provisions of shrewd individuals, create centres of freedom such as are eliminated by the blind and unconscious process of simple social selection.” Thus, the social “rescue” of culture by political and administrative institutions does not follow any superior logic or goal of these institutions; rather, it occurs as an exception – but a momentous one – when convincing actors or personalities succeed in making use of the modest freedoms and resources offered to them by political and administrative institutions, for the benefit of culture.

Adorno’s essay points out that when coordination of the social production of culture and meaning is left to market mechanisms, this leads to a levelling in the sense of mass culture production. In late capitalist societies, only state intervention is capable of protecting the creation of sophisticated forms of culture, even if this effect is not due to a systematic characteristic of the whole administrative apparatus. One could say that this focus on “shrewd individuals” allows the transition from a structure-oriented to an actor-centred approach; the many individuals taken together seem to unfold a social process that is not just of marginal significance. It is their normative patterns of orientation, their intuition, and their culturalization, which make possible the social (re-)production of qualitatively meaningful cultural forms.

Adorno’s reflections are not only a contemporary diagnosis of the situation in respect of the new, but as yet poorly considered phenomenon of a quasi-industrially structured culture industry. The effect on international cultural policy of the cultural analyses contained in the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” by Adorno und Horkheimer is shown by the fact that UNESCO appropriated their ideas concerning the impoverishment of culture through its commodification, as propounded by the exponents of the Frankfurt school (Tomlinson 1997: 119), while the culture-industry concept introduced by Adorno and Horkheimer was taken up in UNESCO documents, for instance in the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Diversity, and was even defined in this convention (unesco 2005: Art. 4).

The “unease” expressed by Adorno in the face of administered culture reappears, if not as a concept at least as a figure of thought, in the current international debates on the protection of intangible traditions. The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (unesco 2003) is intended to protect local cultural traditions from disappearing as a result of social processes
of modernization, in other words as a result of the forces associated with market conditions and manipulated mass taste as described by Adorno. But how can the spontaneous character of intangible traditions be preserved when they are administered, distinguished with the label of an international organization, and made the object of action plans that are supposed to administratively ensure their continued existence? (see also Goytisolo 2001; Schmitt 2005).

The regulation of culture in British Cultural Studies

Cultural Studies in Britain is concerned with the production und social steering of cultural forms and artefacts. In this subchapter we will take a look at a research programme presented jointly at the end of the 1990s by several authors under the direction of Stuart Hall in the six-volume Open University series “Culture, Media and Identities”. This programme enjoyed a relatively broad reception, and is directly related to the question of cultural governance. The authors name “five central cultural processes” or situations as basic to their analysis of objects, these being (1) representation, (2) identity, (3) production, (4) consumption and (5) regulation. In addition to the cultural artefact’s public representation (“how it is presented”), its contribution to the construction of social identity (“what social identities are associated with it”) is of interest, as well as the background and circumstances of its own production and consumption (“how it is produced and consumed”), and finally the regulation of the cultural artefact and its use and formation through social, governmental and economic institutions (“what mechanisms regulate its distribution and use”) (du Gay et al. 1997: 3). These concepts are arranged in a circular fashion, the “circuit of culture” (Fig. 1). According to the authors, a comprehensive study of a cultural text or a cultural artefact, a “cultural study” (du Gay et al. 1997: 4) of a specific object, requires passing through all the stations of this cultural circuit.

In the first volume of the “Culture, Media and Identities” series, the culture-circuit model is demonstrated in practice, using the example of what was a comparatively new cultural artefact in the 1990s, the Sony Walkman. The authors show how each station in the circuit must be visited, but that any station can be taken as the starting point. The circular arrangement of the concepts is significant because for analyses involving one concept, the neighbouring concepts are necessarily also important. The circuit of culture is thus a heuristic model in which there is much overlap between individual analyses relating to particular stations.
One volume in the series is devoted to discussing cultural regulation (Thompson 1997); since governance and regulation are closely related concepts (ch. 2), it seems likely that we may find stimulation here for a concept of cultural governance.

Fig. 2: The “Circuit of Culture” as a heuristic concept for cultural analysis in the series of books “Culture, Media and Identities”
Source: After Thompson (1997a: 3), see also du Gay et al. (1997). In Thompson (1997) the concept of regulation occupies a central position and is therefore emphasized in this variant of the graphic representation of the circuit of culture.

The authors of the series use the concept of cultural regulation in loose reference to the economic regulation school of French provenance. But at the same time they reject its economic regulation theory as a general basis for the analysis of cultural objects (Thompson 1997a: 3). In general, regulation, or cultural regulation, is linked by the authors to cultural politics, and to the (not necessarily unchanged) reproduction of structures:

“Regulation has a number of meanings, depending on the context. It can refer to something as specific as government policies and regulations (and their change or abolition, as in policies of de-regulation). At other times it has the more general sense of the reproduction of a particular pattern and order of signifying practices (so that things appear to be ‘regular’ or ‘natural’). The study of forms of regulation inevitably raises questions both of cultural policy (by some regulating authority) and of cultural politics, involving struggles over meaning, values, forms of subjectivity and identity” (Thompson 1997a: 3).
The continuation of this passage shows that according to this view cultural regulation is multi-factorial. Economic influences and power structures, but also the actions of individual and cultural actors have an influence on the results of cultural regulation:

“Regulation does not mechanically reproduce the status quo. It is a dynamic process that is often contested, and while the outcome is likely to be affected by economic pressures and power structures, we will argue that it also depends on specific circumstances and on the creative actions of individuals and groups” (Thompson 1997a: 3).

In the papers on cultural regulation in Thompson (1997), reference is made to different schools of thought, depending on the cultural area (such as media, leisure culture, sexual morality, cultural imperialism), in order to be able to grasp different cultural regulations. The prominent cultural theorists referred to include representatives of critical theory (Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas), as well as Antonio Gramsci, and among the French post-structuralists especially Michel Foucault. The debate on cultural globalization which began in the 1990s had a broad echo, and was actively encouraged by scholars in the field of cultural studies (see Hall 1997; Tomlinson 1997). While critical theory between the 1940s and the 1960s was mainly concerned in its cultural analysis with the relationship between the mass media, mass culture, the state and the public, British cultural studies, although continuing to show an interest in these topics, also addressed contemporary issues of multi-culturalism and cultural globalization in the 1990s, which were far less important for the critical theory of the 1960s.

The volume entitled “Media and Cultural Regulation” (Thompson 1997) treats a variety of topics in its attempt to explain the concept of cultural regulation, and, at least implicitly, the analyses seem to be based on a number of different concepts of regulation. In one chapter there is a discussion of various leisure policies practised in England from the 18th century to the present. Here, the relations between economic production and cultural regulation can be most clearly shown by reference to the theoretical programme of the economic regulation school (Thompson 1997b: 18-24; Henry 1993). In the book’s concluding chapter, Stuart Hall demonstrates that while cultural forms of expression are regulated by other social subareas (industry, the state) and by different groups of actors, the daily practice of individuals is steered by cultural norms. Regulation here means “governing cultures” (Hall 1997: 227) or “governing the conduct of cultural life” (Hall 1997: 233). Due to culture’s central position – for “it is culture which governs us” (Hall 1997: 232, emphasis in original) – the question of the regulation of culture gains special significance. Here, Hall intro-
roduces the concept of the “governance of culture” (1997: 227) rather incidentally, by equating the concept of cultural policy with the “regulation and governance of culture”, and referring briefly to the central questions and themes treated in the volume:

This volume “has discussed various aspects of cultural policy – the regulation and governance of culture – with respect to broadcasting and the broadcasting institutions; censorship of the arts; the relationship of minority cultures to ‘mainstream’, national cultural traditions; control of the international flow of cultural goods and images; the regulation of morality and representations of sexuality (…). It has also asked broader questions (…) about modes of cultural regulation in general. What is the relation between ‘culture’ and other forces which exert a controlling, shaping or determining force over culture? Is it primarily politics, the economy, the state, the market which is the determining factor in relation to culture?” (Hall 1997: 227).

Thus, Hall proposes a programme for applying the concept of cultural regulation which can also be significant for the concept of cultural governance. However, the concept of cultural governance used by Hall (1997) at the end of this volume is not explained further, nor the relation between governance and regulation. This also applies to the remarkable article by Thompson (2001) entitled “Cultural Studies, Critical Theory and Cultural Governance”, in which he discusses references to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school by scholars in British cultural studies. Despite his title, in the text Thompson (2001) uses the terms cultural regulation and cultural policy rather than that of cultural governance; the meaning of cultural governance seems to oscillate between the two concepts, or to be a kind of umbrella term covering them both. In any case, the adoption of the concept of cultural governance by scholars of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies allowed them to use their own concepts of cultural regulation for shaping an idea of cultural governance, without this appearing to be an inadmissible usurpation of a tradition of thought.

However, their simple conception of the circuit of culture is not unproblematic. To a certain degree, it appears to have been presented as an alternative to classic cultural analyses, for instance in the field of art history, where great weight was attached to the person of individual cultural actors (whether artists or patrons), their motives and the concepts and ideas they wanted to express. The same applies to the material properties and aesthetic effects of cultural objects. These aspects may be captured in individual analyses in cultural studies, for instance in respect of the production of cultural objects. But there is something unsatisfactory about the fact that they remain invisible in the central conception of the circuit of culture.
3.2 Existing definitions of cultural governance

In the existing literature, the concept of cultural governance – sometimes also called culture governance – is used in different ways. This chapter offers an overview of these different uses, followed by a presentation of my own concept of cultural governance in relation to these authors and to the theoretical traditions outlined in ch. 3.1.

Cultural governance as sectoral cultural policy. Cultural policy as an example of cultural governance

Jae Moon (2001: 432f.) defines cultural governance in a sense that can be broadly understood as government cultural policy, especially the promotion of culture by the government, so that it is more or less synonymous with cultural policy:

“Cultural governance (...) is defined as government’s direct or indirect involvement in the promotion and administration of programs of cultural organizations (including museums) existing in specific geographic boundaries with unique financial and administrative arrangements”.

In his article, Moon (2001) makes a comparative study of the organization of cultural promotion and cultural policies, including their financing, in three specific “cultural districts” in the USA. Moon focuses mainly on the promotion of institutions associated with high culture (concert halls, theatres, museums), but also includes libraries, gardens and educational institutions. In this study, Moon uses a fairly narrow concept of culture (see also Tab. 3). His concept of cultural governance largely corresponds to that of sectoral cultural policy, related to socially accepted cultural or artistic practices. However, Moon’s formal definition of cultural governance appears to be too narrow, since it refers only to the national level and the level of the subordinate regions, but not international cultural policy.

If we take the example of the Federal Republic of Germany to examine sectoral cultural policy, it can be seen that cultural policy changed along with a changing understanding of the concept of culture. The ‘68 movements in Western Europe and the USA encouraged new social Utopias, new notions of a “good”, equitable society, and finally developed their own cultural codes and forms of expression. Under the impression of the ‘68 movement and the social-democratization of federal German politics between 1969 and 1982, certain cultural forms, such as the protest song or political cabaret, developed an extraordinary vitality and were actively encouraged – in differing degrees depending on the political tendency – on the local political and administrative level (see the discussion in ch. 3.1 on Adorno 1972, orig. 1960). “Cul-
tural policy is social policy”: this programmatic statement was made around 1970 by Alfons Spielhoff, Dortmund’s city councillor in charge of cultural affairs. The government’s traditional policy of promoting the representative culture of the educated middle classes did not come to an end, but was extended to include new goals: participation in this public representative culture was to be democratized, and monetary and social barriers were to be removed (“culture for all!”). Moreover, with an extended concept of culture, new cultural forms of production, or ones which up to then had been rather marginalized, also received public attention, and emphasis was laid on the importance for social identity of everyday cultural production. In the 1970s local cultural policy worked with a changed concept of culture that became accepted in society. In contrast to Moon (2001), the understanding of cultural policy we are dealing with here cannot simply be equated with cultural governance; rather, cultural policy on the national and local levels is an important part of the fields of governance that are concerned with culture. The example of local cultural policy from the 1970s to the present day also clearly reveals the possibilities and limits of state influence on cultural governance: it seems that state actors can effectively support existing trends, but in the medium term they are scarcely able to implement a cultural policy that goes against the trend, i.e. against the culturally dominant spirit of the times. A study of shifts in cultural policy on the local level in the Federal Republic of Germany since about 1970 provides useful material for reflecting on cultural governance. It shows what kind of influence public cultural policy can have on cultural production, and that public cultural policy itself is also affected by cultural developments and upheavals in society. With its available resources, it can contribute to shaping and influencing these developments, and can either reinforce or attenuate them.

*Culture governance as cultural management and a political form of steering in the reflexive modern age*

Henrik Bang (2004) uses the concept of *culture governance* in a very specific sense: for him culture governance is a “new kind of top down leadership and management” (Bang 2004: 159):

“Culture governance is about how political authority must increasingly operate through capacities for self- and co-governance and therefore needs to act upon, reform, and utilize individual and collective conduct so that it might be amenable to its rule” (Bang 2004: 157).

10 Quoted after Pankoke (2004: 26).
In Bang, culture governance appears as a normative concept and meta-concept for established notions such as *good governance*, *interactive governance* or *human resource management* (loc. cit.: 159). However, Bang is not concerned with the creation of better strategies for applied culture management as practised by decision-makers, as one might think at first glance. Rather, he discusses and problematizes colonization of the public political space by more recent communication-oriented strategies of the top-down governing type, which subordinates everyday policy-making to its own logic of success. Bang’s argumentation is reminiscent of Habermas’ (1981) metaphor of colonization of the lifeworld by functional social systems; here, the colonization of politics takes place through sophisticated government techniques involving dialogue, under the watchword of governance, such as have become fashionable in the reflexive modern age. However, Bang’s designation of this “development” as *culture* governance appears to be poorly motivated and not very plausible. It refers to more recent research approaches to governance, according to which certain discourses and “competing sets of convictions” influence the work of public administration (Bang 2004: 157). We could ask, however, which forms of power this does not apply to. On the level of academic description, we could also ask how far it is possible to regard as new the insight that the actions of members of the public administration are influenced by “sets of convictions”.

*Cultural governance in the field of post-colonial studies*

The concept of cultural governance appears in works which can be placed in the broad field of post-colonial studies. The concept is found, for instance, in the subtitle of Michel Shapiro’s (2004) monograph “Methods and Nations”, which describes the role of cultural production, whether landscape painting or the film industry, in the homogenization of nation states or the creation of national identity. Thus, Shapiro’s work basically continues Edward Said’s works “Orientalism” (2003, orig. 1978) and “Culture and Imperialism” (1994, orig. 1993), in which the latter examines, among other things, the direct and the implicit legitimization of colonialism in Western literature and painting. Referring to Shapiro (2004), David Campbell (2003: 57) understands cultural governance as a

“set of historical practices of representation – involving the state but never fully controlled by the state – in which the struggle for the state’s identity is located.”

Here, cultural production serves to help spread certain ideas, in particular national ideologies, but also the collective material interests of privileged classes, as in
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. While the programmes proposed by Shapiro and Campbell are certainly academically exciting and important, Campbell’s definition of cultural governance can be linked only in part to customary uses of the concept of governance. Both authors are mainly concerned with practices of representation that are connected with those of social steering, regulation or governance, but which can be separated from them analytically (see the concept of the circuit of culture in Fig. 1). Shapiro and Campbell understand culture not as an object so much as a medium of governance or political steering; their programmes are concerned with governance by culture rather than governance of culture. In any case, assumptions about reality, about what is right and wrong, which Johan Galtung (1996 Part III) would refer to as deep cultural patterns, are expressed in political forms of steering and processes of negotiation and between actors.

The above definitions of cultural governance are characterized by the fact that they fail to reflect the multi-layeredness of the concept of culture.

3.3 On the conception and operationalization of cultural governance in the social sciences: a research programme

For the reconstruction of cultural governance structures and processes, the same principles and procedures should apply as have been formulated in a general way for the reconstruction of governance in the social sciences in ch. 2. These include equal consideration of (1) actors/individuals and their actions/practices, (2) institutions and structural moments, and (3) discourses and concepts/ideas. Processes of cultural governance can also be subjected to normative valuations.

But what specific aspects must be considered in the reconstruction of cultural governance? We can make some suggestions here in the light of the above discussion.

(1) The “centrality” of culture

The societal negotiation and steering of the production of sense and meaning, cultural orientation systems and their symbols, and cultural and artistic forms of expression is the topic addressed in the cultural governance approach. This approach emphasizes the “centrality” of culture, in comparison to other sectoral governance fields, such as urban governance, risk governance or environmental governance (cf. Hall 1997: 227), for culture must be thought of as being directly complementary to the concept of society: everything that is social also involves cultural elements. This special position attributed to culture must be reflected in the concrete concept of cultural governance.
(2) **The consequences of different concepts of culture for understandings of cultural governance**

As shown in ch.1.2, it is possible to distinguish between different concepts of culture, and therefore also between narrow and broad concepts of cultural governance (Tab. 3). Depending on the particular question or topic to be investigated, it is thus permissible and legitimate to start pragmatically from a sectoral understanding of cultural governance, despite the “centrality of culture”; the traditional field of cultural policy corresponds roughly to this sector. However, it is conceivable that this kind of pragmatic sectoral approach may hide important socio-cultural implications of the governance in question. Independently of the researcher’s own academic conception of culture, the potential influence of different concepts of culture in the research field must be taken into account. In concrete areas of investigation, the adjective “cultural” can and must be replaced by specific words and formulations, in order to be able to show the social relevance of the analysis. Thus, in any concrete case it is important to ask whether the “object” (whether a building, a poem, a song, an argumentation) is recognized, for instance, as a “Gothic masterpiece”, “heritage of humanity”, a “genuine expression of Turkish culture”, “authentic rap”, “clearly Roman Catholic”, “in agreement with the basic principle of Marxism”, or “truly Islamic” – or whether certain authorities deny this quality to the object in question.

(3) **Governance of the cultural versus culture of governance**

Not only the objects of governance that are referred to as cultural, but also the governance structures and processes themselves reproduce or are influenced by norms, and thus by cultural orientation systems. Put in simple (and thus admittedly imprecise) terms, we can say that a “governanced culture” is confronted with a “culture of governance” (see also Hall 1997). The norms and connotations of the regulated forms of cultural expression, and the dominating norms of the governance system, may be congruent or complementary, but may also be completely different or diametrically opposed. It can be assumed that the nature of this relationship does not leave either the forms of cultural expression or the regulating governance system unchanged.

(4) **The existential relevance of culture and the importance of cultural governance**

The concept of culture is directly linked to the pair of concepts “sense and meaning”. In many semiotic approaches used in the *Kulturwissenschaften*, “culture” or “sense” and “meaning” are seen only as the result of successful or unsuccessful communica-
tion processes and attempts at interpretation, in which such a meaning, and thus “sense”, is attributed to ciphers, signs and symbols. For semiotic approaches, such an understanding of sense and meaning may be sufficient. But in ordinary usage “sense” also touches on an existential dimension that goes beyond a textual level and can only be found outside the text. Under certain circumstances, a performance, a song or a sound, a poem, a ritual, the sight of a cultural landscape or a material artefact may affect a person existentially at a particular moment. The possibility of such an existential experience is not tied to the external “cultural” object; it takes place in the viewer, the receptive person; the cultural object functions as a kind of trigger. This existential personal experience of sense, even though as a rule transient, tied to the moment, and not reproducible at the press of a button, may at first elude social steering but it is socially relevant. Existential experiences of sense are possible under the most adverse circumstances, even, paradoxically, in situations that appear to be senseless (for instance in war). Large parts of cultural production are not designed to convey existential sense. However, there is one part of the cultural institutions in a society that has as its goal the opening up of a space for sense experiences. Repressive governance mechanisms are designed to prevent self-determined experiences of sense. Thus, the concept of cultural governance is concerned with the social “availability” and plurality of possible existential sense experiences, or their suppression in accordance with Galtung’s (1996) concept of cultural violence.

(5) Cultural governance and the regulation of culture
In ch. 3.1, we presented the concept of cultural regulation, as represented by some scholars in British cultural studies around Stuart Hall. As shown in ch. 2.1, there is a clear relationship between concepts of governance and concepts of regulation, so that many authors tend to use the two terms synonymously. Here, too, it is argued that there is an area of overlap between the two concepts, and that in many contexts it thus makes no great difference whether one speaks of governance or regulation. One important difference between the two concepts is that governance approaches are generally directed towards the reconstruction of processes of negotiation between concrete (individual as well as collective or corporate) actors, and can thus also be based on assumptions from the theory of practice, while regulation approaches tend to use “anonymous” social mechanisms in order to explain a particular mode of regulation or particular models of steering, as is very clear in the regulation school. Many of the questions and topics treated in British cultural studies using various forms of the concept of regulation could also be treated using a governance approach, and in
many cases a governance approach would actually be more appropriate. Some scholars in British cultural studies have used the concept of cultural governance, without any noticeable difference from cultural regulation becoming visible (ch. 3.1). The model of the culture circuit, which uses the concept of regulation, can serve as inspiration for a comprehensive analytical framework for the study of cultural governance. However, its shortcomings also need to be recognized, since it tends to obscure the researcher’s view not only of the cultural actors, and the ideas behind a cultural object, but also for instance of its aesthetic effects and material properties.

(6) Cultural governance, cultural practices, signifying practices and agency
As in the model of the circuit of culture in Du Gay et al. (1997) and Thompson (1997) (see ch. 3.1), the governance of cultural artefacts and objects cannot be viewed separately from their cultural (re-)production and practices of representation and signification. It is this contextualization that permits a kulturwissenschaftliche embedding of the analysis of governance. While in ch. 1.1 we stressed the importance of creating links between the Kulturwissenschaften and the social sciences, it is equally important in academic discussions to take into account the special characteristics of cultural objects. Objects only become cultural objects through signifying practices (see Hall 1997a) and actions, which may be a part of everyday life, or may be carried out by specialized institutions, including academic institutions. Unlike the general focus on routine signifying practices in Hall 1997a, it should not be forgotten that the signification of “cultural” objects can be created not only through every day, routine practices, but in certain areas also through complex processes of decision, which may be the result of an open, unstructured social debate, or of a standardized decision process. As a rule, issues concerning cultural (re-)production need to be addressed by specialists within the individual disciplines known collectively as the Kulturwissenschaften. These include art history, historic building research and conservation, historical cultural geography, the study of religions, history of philosophy, or music and theatre studies, each discipline having its own specific methods and accumulated knowledge. Of course, there are cases in which the (re-)production of cultural objects or artefacts can be studied even without such specialized knowledge. This applies to objects belonging to everyday and pop culture, in other words those objects which became the preferred subject of research in cultural studies (see the “classic” paradigmatic example of the Sony Walkman in du Gay 1997), and which in their reception also aroused interest in New Cultural Geography. Questions of the representation of cultural objects can as a rule be treated using the methods of discourse analysis.
(7) The cultural aspect of normative valuations

Not infrequently, governance approaches are confronted with normative forms and processes of social steering, for instance in respect of the possibility of participation, or defined responsibility and accountability in governance structures (ch. 2.). Of course, the categories used in such academic studies of social phenomena are also related to cultural orientation systems, and are thus not culturally neutral but have their origin as a rule in global hegemonic standards of Western provenance. The implications of this origin must be adequately taken into account in the academic work process.

3.4 A conceptual framework for the study of cultural governance

On the basis of the above reflections, we will now attempt to create a general analytical framework for the study of cultural governance. Objects become cultural objects through signifying practices or actions, through debates or standardized decision processes. These may be a part of everyday life, or they may be carried out by special institutions, or by academic researchers. Following the concept of the circuit of culture (ch. 3.1), the practices and actions involved in the production and reproduction, the signification and representation of cultural objects are investigated, as well as the importance of cultural objects for forming the identity of persons, groups or societies. The signification of an object as “cultural” (whether a building or an ensemble, a poem or song, or a theological argument) can in concrete cases be translated as meaning that the cultural object is referred to, for instance, as a “Gothic masterpiece”, “heritage of humanity”, “authentic rap”, “an authentic expression of Balinese culture”, “clearly Catholic” or “truly Islamic”. The latter examples may serve to indicate that the acceptance or the refusal of such signification may sometimes have considerable relevance in respect of explosive social issues. Cultural governance in the narrow sense means that set of negotiations, actions and practices, institutions and rules which are explicitly directed towards a certain object in its capacity as a cultural object (e.g. as a historical monument). In addition, cultural objects are subject to other forms of governance, rules and political steering, which do not treat them explicitly as cultural objects. In order to be able to understand the governance of a cultural object, this must not just be considered alone, but also in the light of the often conflicting overlaps and interferences between different fields of governance that have an interest in the “cultural object”. Such considerations lead to the concept of cultural governance in the broad sense. For example, the members of a theatre
ensemble may be bound by labour regulations, or the treatment of a historic building may be determined by fire prevention regulations or the specific interests of the users. Conflicting claims to the cultural object may be negotiated discursively, or in some cases concretely, in special arenas of governance (such as committees, parliaments or courts of law). Only here can be seen what importance is attached to the specifically “cultural” by society as a whole. Likewise, different interpretations, attributions of sense and meaning, and conflicting claims in respect of a cultural object can arise within the cultural sphere and be negotiated in arenas. Cultural institutions have a form of self-organization which is at least partially autonomous and not subject to external governance. For the analysis of cultural governance, the general principles of governance analysis can be applied, as set out in ch. 2. Figure 4 was originally developed with cultural artefacts in mind (such as historic buildings and ensembles), but it can also be applied to cultural institutions (such as theatre), questions of cultural diversity, and even cultural macro-institutions such as religions. These have developed signifying practices as a fabric of sense and meaning, and have their own self-organization or governance. On the other hand, they are themselves subject to signifying practices and, at least partially, to attempts at external steering or governance.

The governance of a cultural object always also means the governance of its reproduction or production, its signification and representation, its consumption, and finally any attempt to influence its importance for the identity of individuals or groups. Conversely, the production, signification, representation and consumption of a cultural object are reflected in the manner of its governance. Specific concepts and ideas can be connected both with the cultural object itself, and with the shaping of governance processes (in the sense of politics) and concrete steering attempts (in the sense of policies) in respect of the cultural object. Incompatibilities between these concepts may lead to conflictive forms of cultural governance.

With regard to different cultural object fields, this general framework for the study of cultural governance can be combined with medium-range “material” theories and concepts, for instance with the theoretical perspectives of critical theory in respect of the culture industry.

Cultural phenomena are associated with many thematic fields. Table 4 shows how the general framework for the study of cultural governance can be applied specifically to the field of cultural heritage.
Central concepts from the analytical framework for the study of cultural governance | Concretization with regard to empirical studies of the governance of cultural heritage
---|---
Cultural object | historic monuments, historical old towns, cultural landscapes, World Heritage sites, intangible traditions
Cultural actors (“producers”), ideas and concepts, materials and forms of the cultural object | e.g. artists, actors, writers …
Social actors and institutions of cultural governance in a narrow sense | e.g. the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, ministries of culture, conservation management authorities
Actors and institutions in competing fields of governance | urban and regional planning authorities, companies
Governance arenas | a) cultural governance in the narrow sense: UNESCO World Heritage Committee, b) cultural governance and competing field of governance: e.g. municipal councils
Signification practices and actions

attributing to particular objects the title of “historic monument”, “World Cultural Heritage” or “heritage of humanity”; analysis of the selection processes in terms of the motives of actors, the institutional settings and resulting discourses

Production and reproduction of cultural practices and artefacts

history of the production of the object or the ensemble which has been declared as cultural heritage; analysis of the background of this production

reproduction or conservation of the cultural object, possibly under changed conditions of production, including its heritagization, as well as processes of modernization and globalization and changed technical possibilities

Representation

representation and discursive interpretation of monuments or World Heritage sites in advertising, or in political processes of negotiation (including those which decide on whether the objects should be inscribed on heritage lists)

Consumption

tourist consumption of cultural heritage, including conflicts between the need for conservation and the interests of users

Importance of cultural artefacts for the construction of identities

perception of cultural heritage by certain groups, especially local actors, and its importance (or instrumentalization) for the attribution of identities (to oneself or to others)

Tab. 4: Concepts from the analytical framework for the study of cultural governance and their concrete application in the case of a study of cultural heritage

4. Conclusion

This Working paper has unfolded the concept of cultural governance, which combines the governance approach from the social sciences with thoughts about cultural phenomena and objects as found in the humanities, the Kulturwissenschaften and also in British cultural studies. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that both in the academic world but also in public discourses different concepts of culture co-exist. – This must be reflected in any attempt to conceptualize a cultural governance approach. I hope that that the proposed framework may be useful both for academics and for practitioners working in the field of political steering and the self-organization of cultural institutions.
Bibliography


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